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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950759-CA 
V. : 
JESSE MARIE MARTINEZ, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction entered 
upon a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1995) . 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the post-plea hearing at which defendant was 
committed to the Department of Corrections for a 60-day 
diagnostic evaluation a "critical stage" for the purposes of 
defendant's right to the presence of counsel? 
This issue presents a question of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness. State v. Martinez. 896 P.2d 38, 39-40 
(Utah App. 1995)(questions of constitutional law are reviewed for 
correctness); State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 618 (Utah App. 
1993) (whether a fundamental violation of a defendant's rights 
was implicated is a question of law reviewed for correctness). 
2(A). Did the sentencing court's failure to appoint 
new counsel for the remainder of the May hearing render its 
actions "inherently unfair" and warrant resentencing? 
2(B). Did the sentencing court consider both the 
suitability of the correctional program offered by Parkview 
Community Correctional Center and the difference between 
defendant's and the victim's version of the offense? 
This Court will not disturb a sentence on appeal 
u
"unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to 
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits.'" State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 
1113, 1120 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v, Nuttall, 861 P.2d 
454, 457 (Utah App. 1993)). To find an abuse of discretion, this 
Court must determine that u'no reasonable [person] would take the 
view adopted by the trial court.'" Wright. 893 P.2d at 1120 
(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). An 
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abuse of discretion may occur where the judge's sentencing 
actions were "inherently unfair" or where the sentence imposed 
was wclearly excessive". Wright. 893 P.2d at 1120. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1995)/ aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); and possession of 
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994) (R. 10-11). Pursuant to plea 
negotiations, she entered a guilty plea to aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, on April 11, 1995, in exchange for dismissal 
of the remaining counts (R. 16). The matter was set for 
sentencing on May 23, 1995, to allow for preparation of a 
presentence investigation report (R. 16). 
Although May 23 was initially scheduled as the 
sentencing hearing, the lower court made no effort to sentence 
defendant on that date. Instead, the court began the hearing by 
3 
informing defendant and her counsel that he would be sending 
defendant for a diagnostic evaluation to see if there were 
appropriate alternatives to prison (R. 47). Addendum A. Defense 
counsel then informed the court that defendant had just told him 
that she had filed a bar complaint against him (R. 21, 47). 
Addendum A. Counsel moved to withdraw due to the conflict, 
informing the court that Don Redd handled all conflict cases (R. 
21, 47-48). Addendum A. The trial court granted counsel's 
motion, then explained that the presentence report recommended 
imprisonment, but the court needed more information before it 
could make a final sentencing determination (R. 21-23, 48-49). 
Addendum A. Consequently, the court committed defendant to the 
Department of Corrections for a 60-day diagnostic evaluation 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1995), explained that the 
court would have Mr. Redd contact the appropriate person "at the 
diagnostic[,]" and continued sentencing until July 25, 1995 (R. 
20-23, 49-51). Addendum A. 
Defendant's conflict counsel, Don Redd, appeared with 
her at the July 25 sentencing hearing, and both counsel and 
defendant addressed the court on defendant's behalf (R. 24, 63-
67). Addendum B. The court then sentenced defendant to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of five-years-to-life, 
4 
plus a fine and a surcharge (R. 24, 25-26, 27, 29-30, 66) . 
Addendum B. Defendant challenges her sentence on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the issues on appeal involve procedure and 
sentencing, a detailed statement of facts is unnecessary. 
In 1995, defendant and her nephew, Epifino Chavez, took 
a handgun and went to the victim's home to collect money for a 
car defendant had left with the victim to sell (R. 10-11; 
Presentence Investigation Report [hereinafter nPSR"] at p. 2). 
When the victim claimed to have no money, Chavez pulled the gun 
and threatened the victim (R. 11; PSR at p. 2). Defendant then 
took the gun from Chavez, pointed it at the victim, and 
threatened him (R. 11; PSR at p. 2). Defendant and Chavez took a 
leather jacket and a hunting knife and sheath belonging to the 
victim, then forced the victim at gunpoint to leave his apartment 
and go to defendant's car (R. 12; PSR at p. 2). The victim 
escaped and called the police (R. 12; PSR at p. 2). Defendant 
and Chavez fled, and were captured later in Sunset, Utah (R. 12; 
PSR at p. 2). The victim's property was found in defendant's 
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car, and the loaded weapon was recovered from where it had been 
thrown after defendant and Chavez had fled (R. 12; PSR at p. 2) ^  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant argues that she was deprived of her 
constitutional right to the presence of counsel at her May 23 
sentencing. The record shows that, at the hearing on May 23, 
1995, defendant informed her counsel of her bar complaint against 
him, counsel was permitted to withdraw, conflict counsel 
automatically assumed the case, and, in conflict counsel's 
absence, the court committed defendant for a 60-day diagnostic 
evaluation, then continued sentencing to July. Under the 
specific facts at hand, the May hearing was not a "critical 
stage" of the proceedings for purposes of the presence of 
counsel, and there was no risk that conflict counsel's absence at 
the May hearing could derogate from defendant's right to a fair 
sentencing in July. Sentencing did not occur at the May hearing, 
defendant received an opportunity via the diagnostic evaluation 
to avoid prison, and both defendant and her conflict counsel had 
defendant claims that she did not pull the gun out and 
threaten the victim. Instead, she claims that she had the 
unloaded gun in her pocket at all times, and that the victim saw 
it in her pocket (R. 41-42, 66-67). Addendum B. As noted by the 
court at the change of plea hearing, even defendant's version of 
the incident supports her conviction (R. 41-42) . 
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the full opportunity to make all arguments and appeals to the 
sentencing court at the July sentencing hearing. Hence, the 
absence of conflict counsel at the May hearing neither violated 
defendant's basic right to a fair sentencing nor adversely 
affected her participation in sentencing. Further, the court's 
failure to postpone defendant's commitment for the evaluation 
until conflict counsel was physically present did not rise to the 
level of inherent unfairness so as to warrant resentencing. 
Point II: Defendant's claim that, at the sentencing 
hearing in July, the lower court failed to consider the 
sentencing alternative presented by Parkview Community 
Correctional Center is contrary to the record. The diagnostic 
evaluation report clearly reflects Parkview's acceptance of 
defendant and rejects Parkview in favor of the program available 
in the state prison. Defendant fails to establish error in the 
trial court's reliance on the report's evaluation of the 
sentencing alternatives. Hence, the sentencing court necessarily 
considered the Parkview alternative in accepting the report's 
recommendation, and defendant's claim fails. 
Defendant's claim that the sentencing court was 
required to determine which of conflicting versions of the facts 
underlying the offense was the more credible is without legal 
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support. The fact that the victim's version of the offense 
differed from defendant's does not create an inaccuracy which, by 
statute, the court is permitted but not required to correct. 
Neither is the court required to make credibility determinations 
before sentencing. Both versions were adequately reflected in 
the written reports given to the court, and defendant does not 
establish that either the recommendations or the court's decision 
were based on her failure to conform her version to the victim's 
version. Hence, the court's inaction does not require reversal 
of the sentence. 
MOTMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL AT SENTENCING WHERE DEFENDANT 
WAS MERELY COMMITTED FOR A DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION IN THE 
ABSENCE OF CONFLICT COUNSEL, NO SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED AT 
THE CHALLENGED HEARING, AND THE HEARING WAS NOT A 
"CRITICAL STAGE" OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant contends that she was denied her 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at sentencing. 
Specifically, she claims that when she appeared for sentencing on 
May 23, 1995, the trial court first granted her counsel's verbal 
motion to withdraw, then, without appointing new counsel, 
proceeded to "sentence" her to the custody of the Department of 
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Corrections for a 60-day diagnostic evaluation. Br. of App. at 
19-24. She argues that the trial court's failure to immediately 
appoint new counsel for the remainder of the hearing or to get 
defendant's waiver of her right to counsel constituted a denial 
of the right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, 
prevented her from presenting her case in mitigation of 
sentencing, and requires that her sentence be vacated. Id. 
Moreover, she argues that the trial court's actions constituted 
plain error and exceptional circumstances, thereby excusing her 
failure to raise this issue below. Id. at 17-19. Finally, she 
contends that the court's action was so inherently unfair as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion and warrant reversal of the 
sentence. Id. at 25. 
A T The Court's Failure t<? Sua Sponte Continue the May Hearing 
Until Defendant's Conflict Counsel Could be Physically Present 
does not Amount to Plain Error or an Abuse of Discretion 
This Court will not disturb a sentence on appeal unless 
the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Wright. 893 
P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App. 1995) . To find an abuse of 
discretion, this Court must determine that "xno reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" 
Wright, 893 P.2d at 1120 (quoting State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978)). An abuse of discretion may occur where the 
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judge's sentencing actions were "inherently unfair". Wright, 893 
P.2d at 1120. 
Additionally, defendant's assertion of error requires 
that she prove that 1) an error occurred; 2) the error was 
obvious; and 3) the error was harmful. State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 
856, 861 (Utah 1995). 
If the May hearing at issue here had involved the 
pronouncement and imposition of defendant's sentence, this Court 
would be faced with a "critical stage" at which the absence of 
counsel generally would constitute an error not subject to a 
harmlessness analysis. See Wagstaff v. Barnes. 802 P.2d 774, 776 
(Utah App. 1990) (and cases cited therein). However, not only was 
defendant not sentenced at the May hearing, but the court 
necessarily appointed conflict counsel and continued sentencing 
for two months in order to obtain a diagnostic evaluation report. 
Consequently, a more precise statement of the issue is whether 
the lower court committed plain error by failing to, sua sponte. 
refrain from committing defendant for the diagnostic evaluation 
until such time as conflict counsel could be physically present. 
Although, arguably, it would have been easy and preferable for 
the court to continue the hearing simply to have conflict counsel 
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present, the court's failure to do so does not rise to the level 
of plain error. 
The facts of the May hearing bear careful review.2 As 
the hearing began, defendant was represented by her original 
appointed counsel (R. 46-47). Addendum A. The court's first 
statement to the parties informed them that it intended to "send 
[defendant] down to diagnostic and have an evaluation before 
commitment to the prison to determine if that's appropriate or if 
there's other programs" (R. 47). Addendum A. Thus, the court's 
fintent was clear from the beginning of the hearing. Only then 
did defense counsel inform the court of defendant's bar complaint 
against him, identify Don Redd as conflict counsel, then move to 
withdraw from the case (R. 21, 47-48). Addenda C and A, 
respectively. When conflict counsel becomes necessary, the 
2It appears that the transcript of the May hearing may be 
incomplete. Defendant's brief reflects that defense counsel 
uinterrupted" the trial court during the May hearing to seek 
withdrawal. Br. of App. at 7-8. However, the transcript 
essentially begins with defense counsel's "interruption" (R. 47). 
Addendum A. Counsel told the court that defendant informed him 
of the bar complaint that morning "after we took the break" (R. 
47). Addendum A. No break is reflected in the transcript. 
Further, counsel stated to the court that defendant told him for 
the first time that day "that she wanted to change her plea[] and 
£§ I put QXl the record eflrlisr, I notified her that she did miss 
the 3 0 days." (R. 47-48) (emphasis added). Addendum A. No such 
comment is reflected earlier in the transcript. 
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courts necessarily appoint the individual or firm who has the 
contract with the county. The court's understanding of this was 
demonstrated by its representation that it would have Mr. Redd 
contact the Department of Corrections (R. 51). Addendum A. 
Accordingly, conflict counsel was necessarily appointed, and the 
motion to withdraw was granted (R. 21, 48) . Addenda C and A, 
respectively. 
Immediately thereafter, in the brief span of time in 
which Mr. Redd was not physically present with defendant, the 
court explained to defendant that it was committing her to the 
custody of the Department of Corrections for a 60-day diagnostic 
evaluation in order to have more information about possible 
sentencing alternatives, noting that the presentence report 
recommended imprisonment and the court needed more information to 
determine whether something besides imprisonment might be 
appropriate (R. 49). Addendum A. The court then continued 
sentencing to July 25, 1995, and ended the hearing (R. 51). 
Addendum A. 
The court easily could have stopped the hearing after 
granting the motion to withdraw and reset it for a time when Mr. 
Redd could be physically in the courtroom. However, no purpose 
would have been served by such action under the facts of this 
12 
case. The court made it clear that defendant would either have 
the evaluation done or be sentenced to prison, and that he would 
not release her pending any further action in the case (R. 47, 
49-50) . Addendum A. The decision to send a defendant for a 
diagnostic evaluation is totally within the discretion of the 
sentencing court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1995). 
Addendum D. The evaluation provides defendant with an opportunity 
to avoid imprisonment, which she requested of the court below (R. 
65). Addendum B. A delay of the proceedings to await counsel's 
presence would have served no purpose except to delay either the 
evaluation or the sentence of imprisonment. 
Defendant complains that if she had the benefit of 
counsel at the May hearing, she would have been in a position to 
''marshal [] commendations and arguments in mitigation of the 
impending sentenced imposed." Br. of App. at 21. Such 
presentations were not sought by the court at the May hearing, 
and would have been premature where the court was not imposing 
sentence. Further, defendant's new counsel did not thereafter 
object to any lost opportunity to present arguments in mitigation 
of sentencing, but was given the opportunity to provide any 
argument he saw fit at the July sentencing hearing. Hence, it 
was not obvious, even to defendant's own counsel, that his 
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failure to be physically present when defendant was committed for 
the evaluation prevented her from presenting her case in 
mitigation of sentencing. Where defendant had conflict counsel 
appointed at the May hearing, received a chance to avoid prison, 
then had full benefit of counsel at the July sentencing hearing, 
the harm she identifies did not occur, and the court's failure to 
postpone the evaluation until conflict counsel could physically 
appear with defendant did not constitute obvious error or 
inherent unfairness. 
ILi The May Hearing w^s not a Critical Stage for Purposes of the 
Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant's characterization of the May hearing as a 
"sentencing" hearing, and her use of cases proclaiming that 
sentencing is a "critical stage" for purposes of the right to the 
presence of counsel, is misleading. The May hearing, originally 
scheduled for sentencing to coincide with the completion of the 
presentence investigation report, was not a sentencing hearing 
because no sentence was imposed; instead, sentencing was 
continued for two months. 
There appears to be no authority involving the precise 
situation before this Court. However, under existing authority, 
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the May hearing does not qualify as a "critical stage" warranting 
reversal because of defense counsel's absence. 
In the context of criminal proceedings, a "critical 
stage" is a point at which the assistance of counsel is necessary 
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial. See 
State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778, 785 n.25 (Utah 1980); Cavaness 
v. Cox. 598 P.2d 349, 354 (Utah 1979); see also Coleman v. 
Alabama. 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 2003 (1969) (whether a 
preliminary hearing is a critical stage "depends. . . upon an 
analysis [of] 'whether potential substantial prejudice to 
defendant's rights inhere [s] in the . . . confrontation . . . 
. " ) ; United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 
1931 (1967) (a critical stage is a stage "where the results might 
well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a 
mere formality."). The concept applies to sentencing as well. 
Kuehnert V, Turner, 499 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Utah 1972). Part of 
the rationale is the need to have counsel present to give 
defendant an opportunity to present to the court facts in 
extenuation of sentencing or in explanation of defendant's 
conduct, to correct any mistakes in the reports or other 
information upon which the court will rely, and "to appeal to the 
equity of the court in its administration and enforcement of 
15 
penal laws.* Kuehnert. 499 P.2d at 840-41; see also State v. 
Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (emphasizing the 
importance of correcting errors at the time of sentencing in 
order to obtain a fair proceeding). 
However, not every point in the criminal process 
constitutes a "critical stage" for purposes of the right to the 
presence of counsel. For example, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized a distinction between a critical stage and 
the preparatory steps taken by the prosecution to gather 
evidence, e.g., conducting a lineup or taking and analyzing the 
accused's fingerprints or blood sample. Wade. 388 U.S. at 227, 
87 S.Ct. at 1232-33 (recognizing that such preparatory steps are 
not "critical stages" at which the right to the presence of 
counsel is required), cited with approval in £avail£5£, 598 P.2d 
at 353. Because, in these instances, the availability and 
uniformity of scientific techniques give a defendant "the 
opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the [prosecution's] 
case at trial through the ordinary process of cross-examination 
of the [prosecution's] expert witnesses and the presentation of 
the evidence of his own experts[,]" such preparatory steps 
involve "minimal risk" that defense counsel's absence at such 
16 
stages might derogate from defendant's right to a fair trial. 
Wade 388 U.S. at 227, 87 S.Ct. at 1933. 
The same rationale applies in this sentencing context. 
Although defendant may have anticipated that she would be 
sentenced on May 23, sentencing was continued to allow for 
preparation of the diagnostic evaluation. The only thing done at 
the May hearing in conflict counsel's absence was the preparatory 
step of submitting defendant for the 60-day diagnostic evaluation 
in order to provide the court with more information and possible 
alternatives to incarceration so that the court could make an 
informed sentencing decision (R. 48-51).3 Addendum A. The 
diagnostic evaluation was done at the discretion of the trial 
court for an appropriate purpose, and defendant had no right to 
refuse to submit to the evaluation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 
(1995); Addendum E. Once all the information sought by the court 
3That the lower court only committed defendant for the 
evaluation and intended that sentencing be continued to July is 
clear from the record, despite the court's use of language more 
appropriate to sentencing. R. 49, Addendum A (court says it 
"sentence[s] [defendant] to the department of corrections for a 
60-day evaluation"); R. 22, Addendum D (written order states 
"There being no legal reason presented to the Court why judgment 
should not be pronounced . . . n ) . The court's actions at the 
May hearing were to commit defendant for the evaluation and 
continue sentencing to July when all the necessary information 
would be before the court, and the language in the written order 
makes it clear that the court harbored no other intent. 
17 
was available in July, defendant was given full opportunity for 
meaningful presentation of any arguments in mitigation or 
clarification of the diagnostic evaluation and the preliminary 
report, as well as in mitigation of sentence.4 Both defendant 
and her counsel were permitted to make whatever arguments they 
chose, and defendant has not identified any arguments counsel 
might have made at the May hearing which were not available at 
the July hearing. Where only the commitment for evaluation 
occurred in conflict counsel's absence at the May hearing, the 
commitment was merely preparatory to sentencing, and defendant 
had full opportunity to provide mitigating arguments or correct 
the sentencing information at the July sentencing hearing, there 
was no risk that counsel's absence could derogate from 
defendant's right to a fair sentencing. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227, 
87 S.Ct. at 1933. 
Moreover, nothing occurred or was said at the May 
hearing in the absence of counsel which could have impacted on 
4At the July hearing, both defense counsel and defendant 
addressed the court and had full opportunity to "marshal[ ] 
commendations and arguments in mitigation of the impending 
sentence" and to "challengte] any discrepancies in the 
Presentence Investigation Report" (R. 63-68; Addendum B). Br. of 
App. at 21-22. Defendant does not challenge in this appeal her 
new counsel's performance at the July hearing. 
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the July sentencing hearing, and nothing in the July hearing 
suggested that the trial court was in any way influenced by 
anything which occurred at the May hearing. The hearings 
involved different conduct, and no mention was made at either 
hearing of anything that occurred at the other hearing. 
Consequently, not only was the May hearing not a "critical stage" 
requiring the presence of defense counsel, but there was no error 
in ordering the evaluation in the absence of conflict counsel, 
and there was no involvement of a constitutional right so basic 
to a fair trial that the court's failure to suspend the hearing 
was necessarily harmful. Cavaness, 598 P.2d at 353-54; State v. 
Codianna. 573 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1977) (the absence of defendant 
and his counsel from an in-chambers hearing was harmless error). 
Defendant relies on two cases which illustrate that a 
trial court may commit error when it sentences a defendant 
without the presence of an advocate speaking on his behalf. Brief 
of App. at 22-23. Both involve defendants who were actually 
sentenced by the courts to prison terms without representation by 
counsel at the time of sentencing. United States v. Daniels, 558 
F.2d 122, 125, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1977) (at the sentencing hearing, 
defendant sought new counsel, and "for all practical purposes" 
acted without counsel for the rest of the hearing, at which he 
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was sentenced); Williams v. State. 600 So.2d 524 (Fla. App. 
1992)(at the sentencing hearing, counsel was dismissed on 
defendant's motion, defendant's request for new counsel was 
denied, and sentence was imposed). Because the May hearing in 
this case did not constitute a "critical stage" but merely served 
the preparatory purpose of permitting the sentencing judge to 
obtain evidence necessary to the ultimate sentencing decision, 
with another opportunity provided for defendant to present 
evidence and argument in mitigation of sentence, defendant's 
cases are easily distinguished. 
Under the specific facts surrounding the May hearing, 
the lower court did not commit error in failing to suspending the 
proceedings pending named conflict counsel's physical presence. 
Neither was the court's action in giving defendant the potential 
benefit of a diagnostic evaluation in the absence of conflict 
counsel's presence so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse 
of discretion. Consequently, both defendant's plain error and 
exceptional circumstances arguments necessarily fail. See State 
v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 862 (Utah 1995) (defendant's plain error 
argument fails where he fails to establish error); State v. 
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 904 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant's arguments 
fail where he does not establish either error or sufficiently 
20 
exceptional circumstances to warrant deviating from the general 
waiver doctrine).5 
PQINT II 
THE SENTENCING COURT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED BOTH AN 
ALTERNATIVE INPATIENT PROGRAM AND THE DIFFERING 
VERSIONS OF THE OFFENSE IN MAKING ITS SENTENCING 
DETERMINATION; ITS FAILURE TO MAKE UNNECESSARY 
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL OF 
THE SENTENCE 
On July 25, 1995, the lower court heard argument and 
imposed sentence upon defendant. Defendant contends that the 
court failed to consider two legally relevant sentencing factors 
mentioned by defendant at the July sentencing hearing, thereby 
warranting reversal of her sentence. Br. of App. at 28-29. 
A sentence may be subject to remand on appeal where a 
trial court fails to consider all legally relevant factors in 
imposing sentence. State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah 
App. 1995) . 
First, defendant argues that the lower court did not 
take the time to determine whether Parkview Community 
defendant's argument ends with a claim that the trial court 
breached its duty to "inquire" into appointing new counsel before 
proceeding further with the May hearing, as well as a duty to 
continue the hearing until counsel appeared. Br. of App. at 24. 
These claims go to the heart of her main argument and do not 
assert additional grounds upon which to argue for reversal of her 
sentence. 
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Correctional Center offered a long-term program suitable for her 
needs. Br. of App. at 28. However, the sentencing court 
factored Parkview into its sentencing decision, both from its own 
knowledge of Parkview and from the diagnostic evaluation. In the 
course of the 60-day evaluation process, an application was 
submitted to Parkview on defendant's behalf, and Parkview 
tentatively accepted defendant into their program (R. 64-65; 
Diagnostic Evaluation Report, p. 4). Addendum B. At the July 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel emphasized the acceptance, 
although counsel was under the mistaken impression that the 
acceptance was not reflected in the evaluation report (R. 64-65). 
Addendum B. The report not only noted Parkview's acceptance of 
defendant, but went on to recommend, in spite of that acceptance, 
that the long-term residential treatment program, which was 
strongly recommended for defendant by the psychologist, could 
best be found at the Utah State Prison, which also offered "an 
excellent mental health and drug abuse therapy program" to meet 
defendant's requests for such programs (Diagnostic Evaluation 
Report, pp. 2, 4). The sentencing court noted its familiarity 
with Parkview and its belief that the program was not 
sufficiently long-term, as was recommended in the evaluation 
report (R. 65-66). Addendum B. The court then chose to follow 
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the recommendation of the Department of Corrections that the 
prison's program was better for defendant (R. 66; Diagnostic 
Evaluation Report, pp. 4-5) . Addendum B. Defendant does not 
establish that the court's memory of Parkview's program was 
erroneous in any respect, that, upon further inquiry, the court 
would have found Parkview more suitable for her than the prison's 
program, or that the court cannot rely on the Department of 
Correction's evaluation of Parkview's program. In light of the 
evaluation report's recognition, consideration and rejection of 
Parkview's program, the court necessarily factored Parkview into 
its sentencing decision, and its failure to look further into the 
program does not warrant reversal of the sentence. 
Second, defendant claims that the court failed to 
follow the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) (Supp. 
1995) to clarify what defendant calls a ''discrepancy" in the 
written reports. Br. of App. at 28-29. Section 77-18-1(6)(a) 
reads: 
(a) . . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the 
presentence investigation report, which have not been 
resolved by the parties and the department prior to 
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the 
sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 
ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of 
the report with the department. If after ten working 
days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court 
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shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record• 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) (Supp. 1995). Addendum F. 
The official reports of the offense to which defendant 
entered a plea reflect that defendant held a gun to the victim's 
head and threatened to shoot him (Diagnostic Evaluation Report, 
p. 4; PSR, pp. 2-3) . Defendant has repeatedly denied these 
actions (R. 41-42, 66-67; Diagnostic Evaluation Report, p. 4; 
PSR, p. 3). Immediately after the court pronounced sentence 
below, defense counsel argued that if defendant's refusal to 
admit doing something she did not do affects her progress in the 
treatment program, he was not sure what to do about it (R. 66-
67). Addendum B. The trial court responded to the concern by 
telling counsel to write to the "program people" to explain his 
dilemma (R. 67). Addendum B. 
As a threshold matter, the argument on appeal--that a 
determination of which version is true is necessary to the 
sentencing determination--was not raised below and, therefore, is 
not properly before this Court. State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 
606 (Utah App. 1994) (requiring specific preservation of claim of 
error before trial court). Defense counsel's narrow comment 
below did not tie his concern to the sentencing decision, and the 
24 
trial court answered in kind. Defendant argues neither plain 
error nor deficient performance to excuse her failure to 
adequately preserve this point below. Accordingly, this Court 
need not reach this claim on appeal. Id,: State v. Jennings. 875 
P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant must argue plain error 
before this Court will consider the doctrine); State v. 
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992) (defendant must 
argue plain error and exceptional circumstances before this Court 
will undertake a review of these claims). 
Even on its merits, the claim fails because there is no 
inaccuracy in the reports to be settled. The statute permits the 
court to correct inaccurate information, not differing points of 
view, and does not require that the court do so. Defendant has 
identified a discrepancy or disagreement as to the facts of the 
crime, and both the presentence report and the diagnostic 
evaluation accurately reflect both versions of the incident 
(Diagnostic Evaluation Report, p. 4; PSR, pp. 2-3). Defendant 
makes no attempt to establish that the recommendations in either 
report were based on her refusal to admit that she pulled a gun 
and pointed it at the victim, nor does she explain why a 
determination of which version is correct is "critical" to 
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imposition of her sentence, where both versions support her 
conviction for aggravated robbery. Br. of App. at 29. 
Because no inaccuracy exists, and the trial court was 
presented with both versions of the events and necessarily took 
them both into account in imposing sentence, the court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to make a credibility 
determination to support only one version, and defendant's 
sentence should be affirmed. 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's sentence. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED: NO PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
The State believes that oral argument would be 
beneficial in this case. However, the State does not feel that a 
published opinion is necessary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Cv?7 ^ day of April, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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postage prepaid, to Scott L. Wiggins, Holmgren, Arnold & Wiggins, 
L.C., attorney for appellant, American Plaza II, Suite 404, 57 
West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this day of 
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1 
2 
3 STATE OF UTAH VERSUS JESSIE MARTINEZ. 
4 MR. ALBRIGHT: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY. 
5 THE COURT: LET ME TELL YOU WHAT I'M WILLING 
6 TO DO IN THIS CASE. HAVING REVIEWED THIS, SEND HER 
7 DOWN TO DIAGNOSTIC AND HAVE AN EVALUATION BEFORE 
8 COMMITMENT TO THE PRISON TO DETERMINE IF THAT'S 
9 APPROPRIATE OR IF THERE'S OTHER PROGRAMS. 
10 MR. ALBRIGHT: YOUR HONOR, BEFORE WE GO 
11 FURTHER, IN TALKING WITH MISS MARTINEZ, SHE HAS 
12 INFORMED ME THAT SHE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT AT THE BAR 
13 AGAINST MYSELF. BASED ON THAT, I CANNOT REPRESENT 
14 HER. OBVIOUSLY THAT'S A CONFLICT. MR. CELLA 
15 REPRESENTS THE CO-DEFENDANT IN THIS MATTER AND SO IS 
16 UNABLE TO HANDLE THE SENTENCING AS WELL. I'VE TALKED 
17 WITH MEL WILSON TODAY AND DON REDD IS THE ATTORNEY THAT] 
18 WILL NOW HANDLE CONFLICT CASES. SO WE NEED HER --. 
19 THE COURT: BUT I'M NOT GOING TO RELEASE HER 
2 0 TODAY. I'M NOT GOING TO RELEASE HER WHILE WE WAIT. 
21 MR. ALBRIGHT: I CAN'T REPRRESENT HER AND I'M| 
22 NOT REPRESENTING HER AT THIS TIME. AS I SAID, SHE JUST 
2 3 LET ME KNOW TODAY AFTER WE TOOK THE BREAK. SO -- AND I 
24 HAVE GIVEN HER COPIES OF THE REPORT. SHE HAS IT IN HER 
25 POSSESSION RIGHT NOW. AND FOR THE RECORD, ALSO TODAY 
2 
1 WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT SHE INFORMED ME THAT SHE WANTED 
2 TO CHANGE HER PLEA. AND AS I PUT ON THE RECORD EARLIER, 
3 I NOTIFIED HER THAT SHE DID MISS THE 30 DAYS. THAT SHE 
4 HAD MISSED THE 3 0 DAYS TODAY. I'VE NOT RECEIVED ANY 
5 PHONE MESSAGES FROM MISS MARTINEZ SINCE APRIL WHEN WE 
6 WERE HERE AND TODAY'S THE FIRST TIME I'VE HAD THAT 
7 INFORMATION GIVEN TO ME. SO MY FEELING IS THAT DON 
8 REDD NEEDS TO BE INFORMED THAT HE'S GOING TO BE 
9 REPRESENTING HER AND SHE NEEDS TO TAKE THE PRE-SENTENCE 
10 REPORT THAT SHE HAS OR HE NEEDS TO ACQUIRE ONE BEFORE 
11 SHE IS SENTENCED. 
12 I MAKE A FORMAL MOTION AT THIS TIME TO 
13 WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE ON THE CONFLICT THAT I HAVE ON 
14 THE RECORD. 
15 THE COURT: OKAY. THE COURT WILL GRANT YOUR 
16 MOTION. 
17 MS. MARTINEZ: I DID TRY CALLING HIM. HE DID 
18 CALL ME BACK COLLECT. AND I DID CALL HIM BACK AGAIN 
19 AND LEFT A MESSAGE. I TOLD HIM, PLEASE CALL ME. 
2 0 PLEASE DO NOT CALL ME BACK COLLECT. HE NEVER DID CALL 
21 ME BACK. 
22 MR. ALBRIGHT: THAT WAS IN ANOTHER MATTER. 
23 SHE DIDN'T BRING UP ANYTHING ABOUT THE APPEAL. THAT 
24 INVOLVED -- SHE DIDN'T WANT TO COME TO COURT FOR 
25 SENTENCING. SHE WANTED A CONTINUANCE. IS THAT RIGHT? 
\Xb 
1 MS. MARTINEZ: YES. I ALSO DIDN'T -- WANTED 
2 TO SPEAK TO YOU SOMEMORE. 
3 MR. ALBRIGHT: I DIDN'T TALK TO HER ANY 
4 MORE. I TALKED TO YOUR CLERK AND YOUR CLERK HAD TALKED 
5 TO HER AND TOLD THAT SHE WAS TO COME TO COURT. SO 
6 THERE WAS NOTHING FOR ME TO DISCUSS ON THAT SUBJECT. 
7 SHE PHONED ME, AS SHE DID STATE. HOWEVER, I DID TALK 
8 TO HER ON THAT DAY. WE DID COMMUNICATE. 
9 THE COURT: MS. MARTINEZ, THIS IS THE TIME 
10 SET FOR SENTENCING. THE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT YOU BE 
11 SENTENCED TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON FIVE YEARS TO LIFE. 
12 I BELIEVE THAT I DO NEED MORE INFORMATION AND WHAT I'M 
13 PROPOSING IS SENTENCE YOU TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
14 CORRECTIONS FOR A 60-DAY EVALUATION. IN THE EVALUATION) 
15 THEY DETERMINE YOUR BACKGROUND AND MAKE A 
16 RECOMMENDATION IF YOU SHOULD -- IF I SHOULD FOLLOW THE 
17 RECOMMENDATION OR THAT YOU SHOULD BE IN SOME 
18 ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM. 
19 MS. MARTINEZ: DO I HAVE TO GO TO JAIL 
2 0 TODAY? 
21 THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
22 MS. MARTINEZ: YOU CAN'T GIVE ME A COUPLE OF 
23 DAYS TO GET THINGS STRAIGHTENED OUT WITH MY CHILDREN, 
24 GET THINGS PUT AWAY? 
2 5 THE COURT: NO, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES I'M 
4
,\C\ 
1 CONCERNED ABOUT, WHETHER YOU'D BE THERE --. 
2 MS. MARTINEZ: I ALSO HAVE --MY MOTHER IS 
3 ALSO DYING. THEY DON'T GIVE HER VERY MUCH TIME TO 
4 LIVE. I'LL BE BACK. I'LL DO MY TIME. I KNOW I DID A| 
5 CRIME. 
6 THE COURT: WELL, I'M REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT 
7 POTENTIAL RISK OF NOT BEING THERE, GIVEN THE 
8 CIRCUMSTANCES AND THEREFORE, I'M GOING TO ORDER YOU --. 
9 MR. CAMPAS: YOUR HONOR--
10 THE COURT: STATE YOUR NAME. 
11 MR. CAMPAS: EDWARD CAMPAS. I'M HER 
12 BROTHER. AND YOUR HONOR, I AM THE ONE WHO TOLD HER TO 
13 FILE THE GRIEVANCE AGAINST MR. ALBRIGHT BECAUSE HE HAS 
14 BEEN PREJUDICED AGAINST THIS. HE HAS ASKED -- SHE HAS 
15 ASKED HIM NOT TO REPRESENT HER. 
16 MR. ALBRIGHT: THEN SHE WENT AHEAD AND HAD ME 
17 REPRESENT HER. I OBJECT TO HIM BRINGING ANYTHING UP 
18 THAT'S NOT BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT AT THIS TIME. THE 
19 COURT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT. 
2 0 THE COURT: IF YOU WANT TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE 
21 OF SENTENCING, THAT'S THE ISSUE. 
2 2 MR. CAMPAS: I WILL GRANTEE SHE'LL COME 
2 3 BACK. 
24 THE COURT: WELL, IF SHE COMES BACK YOU ARE 
25 GOING TO HAVE I THINK CIRCUMSTANCES. IN ORDER TO 
5 
1 PROPERLY SENTENCE YOU IN THE CASE, THE ONLY WAY I'M 
2 GOING TO GET INFORMATION IS HAVE THE DIAGNOSTIC AND 
3 THEREFORE, TO THE CHARGE OF ROBBERY, WE'RE GOING TO 
4 CONTINUE THIS TO JULY 25TH AND I'M GOING TO ORDER YOU 
5 COMMITTED TO THE DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS FOR A 60-DAY 
6 EVALUATION AND RETURN YOU FOR THE REPORT SO I CAN HAVE 
7 INFORMATION NECESSARY TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE 
8 IN THIS CASE. 
9 MS. POTTS: DO YOU WANT THAT INFORMATION TO GO 
10 TO MR. REDD? 
11 THE COURT: YES. I'LL HAVE MR. REDD CONTACT 
12 YOU AT THE DIAGNOSTIC. 
13 MR. CAMPAS, YOUR HONOR, IF MY MOTHER DOES 
14 DIE, WILL SHE BE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE FUNERAL. 
15 THE COURT: WHAT YOU'LL HAVE TO DO DEPENDS 
16 ON CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE DIAGNOSTIC PRISON. YOU ARE 
17 GOING TO HAVE TO CONTACT MR. REDD AND WE'LL GIVE YOU 
18 HIS PHONE NUMBER SO YOU CAN CONTACT HIM AND DETERMINE. 
19 THANK YOU 
20 
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1
 " THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Jesse Martinez. Is 
2
 I Mr. Redd here? 
3 H
 This is the time set for sentencing in this matter. I 
received a report from the Department of Corrections based on 
5
 || a 60 day diagnostic they have sent to the Court. Mr. Redd, 
you have had an opportunity to review that with Ms. Martinez? 
MR. REDD: I have, your Honor. 
8
 || THE COURT: Is there any legal reason why sentence 
should not take place at this time? 
MR. REDD: There is none, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is there anything you want to present tcf 
12
 || the Court before I enter sentence in the matter? 
13
 II MR. REDD: Yes, there is. There have been 
14
 " applications made while this evaluation was going on for 
programs that would be designed to aid Ms. Martinez in making 
the changes she needs to make in her life. One of those 
places is Parkview. And it is an inpatient facility. And sh^ 
informed me this morning that they have accepted her to that 
program. That's an alternative that I didn't notice in the 
report. And maybe that information came after the report was 
prepared. But there is an alternative for the Court to put 
her in an inpatient facility where she would be responsible 
and also receive the aid she needs 
And she would be required to remain there. She wouldn't 
have the option of dropping out because she would be under the! 
15 
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4 
1
 I Court's control. And it is her desire, and our request 
2
 therefore, that the Court utilize that option rather than the 
3
 (I option recommended by the report of remaining incarcerated. 
THE COURT: May I just ask, usually Diagnostic 
5
 checks all those programs. And that's a program they 
6
 || regularly check. And that's not— 
MR. REDD: Well, they are the ones that made the 
8
 recommendation—the application, helped her with the 
9
 || application. A man by the name of Warner there had made the 
application. It is just that the response of acceptance of 
her into that program apparently has come back since the 
report was prepared. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else you would 
like to present to the Court? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15
 II MR. REDD: She would like to make a statement. 
16 l!
 MS. MARTINEZ: I would just like to say I would lik^ 
17 
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a chance to go to Parkview and see if I can get my life 
together there, and get my family back together. And that's 
about all I have to say. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think in terms of the report, 
the recommendation is that they felt that there had to be a 
long term program. I am not sure—I am familiar with 
Parkview. I don't think—it is not long term, about two or 
three months. I don't think it is a long term program. I 
think the Court feels given the review and the 60 day 
j> 
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diagnostic the Court is going to follow the recommendation o| 
the Department of Corrections. And that is, to the charge of 
aggravated assault, a felony of the first degree, the 
Defendant is going to be sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
for an indeterminate period of five years to life; $1,250.00 
fine, plus a surcharge of 85 percent; there will be no fireanj 
enhancement or anything with the sentence in this program. 
Now, if you would like to appeal the sentence the Court 
has entered, you must make the appeal within 30 days. 
MR. REDD: Your Honor, there is one other item, if ]j 
could mention it to the Court. 
12
 || THE COURT: Okay 
13
 II MR. REDD: We notice in the report that there is 
14
 significance applied to the fact that Ms. Martinez does not 
acknowledge pulling out the gun, pointing it at the victim, 
and such things as that. And quite a bit of"credence is 
placed on her not making the changes she needs to make by her 
taking that posture. And we are very concerned about that. 
She has adamantly maintained that that didn't happen. 
And the only evidence that I am aware of that is from the 
victim, who has a record that certainly is more horrendous 
than hers as far as believability. Yet the people who are 
working with her seem to insist that she acknowledge conduct 
that she says she didn't commit. And if that's one of the 
roadblocks in making the progress they want her to make, I 
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don't know how we get around that. 
THE COURT: I think it may be well then if you want 
to write a letter to the program people as her counsel and 
explain that, and explain the circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to do that. I think that's the best way to 
address that 
MR. REDD: All right, thank you, your Honor. 
MR. HARWARD: Your Honor, just one matter for the 
record. As I listened to the sentence, the Court 
inadvertently said aggravated assault. 
THE COURT: Aggravated robbery. 
MR. HARWARD: It is aggravated robbery. 
v/\ 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
County of Weber ) 
5
 || I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of th4 
Official Court Reporters for the State of Utah, and a 
competent machine shorthand writer, 
8
 || That on July 25, 1995, I reported in machine shorthand 
the proceedings had and testimony given in the case entitled 
10
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
JESSE MARIE MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
May 23, 1995 
! Case No. 951700140 
JON M. MEMMOTT, JUDGE 
Joanne Pratt, Reporter 
Kathy Potts, Clerk 
This matter comes before the Court for Sentence. Carvel Harward is present as 
counsel for the State of Utah. The defendant is present and represented by William Albright. 
Mr. Albright represents that the defendant has filed a complaint against him to the 
Utah State Bar. Mr. Cella has a conflict because he represented a co-defendant. Don Redd is 
now handling the conflict cases. 
The defendant is requesting to withdraw her plea of guilty. The statutory time has 
passed. 
Mr. Albright makes a motion to withdraw as counsel. The Court grants the motion. 
The Court will appoint Don Redd as counsel for the defendant. 
The Court will order the defendant into the Division of Corrections for a 60 day 
evaluation. 
This matter is set for sentencing on July 25, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. The clerk is directed to 
notify Mr. Redd of that date. 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
V. 
JESSE MARIE MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR 60 DAY EVALUATION 
Case No. 951700140 
CHARGE: Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the first degree 
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of sentence on May 23, 1995. 
Plaintiff appeared by and through Carvel R. Harward, County Attorney for Davis County. 
Defendant appeared in person and by his attorney, Don Redd, whose office address is 44 
North Main Street, Lay ton, Utah, 84041. 
There being no legal reason presented to the Court why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and it appearing to the Court that imprisonment may be appropriate in this case, 
but more detailed information is desirable as a basis for determining the final sentence, than 
has been provided by a presentence report. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant is committed to the custody of the Division of Corrections for a 
period not exceeding 60 days from date hereof, or for such additional time as the Court may 
hereafter grant, not exceeding a further period of 60 days, for a complete study of the 
defendant during that time, inquiring into such matters as the defendant's previous 
delinquency or criminal experience, his/her social background, his/her capabilities, his/her 
mental and emotional and physical health, and the rehabilitative resources or programs which 
may be available to suit his/her needs. 
2. On or before the expiration of the period of commitment defendant shall be 
returned to the Court for sentencing and a written report of the results of the study, including 
whatever recommendations the Division of Corrections believes will be helpful for a proper 
resolution of the case, shall be provided to the Court and to counsel not later than 10 days 
prior to the time fixed for sentencing. 
3. Unless sooner returned or unless the Court extends the time beyond 60 days as 
provided in the preceding paragraph, defendant shall be returned to the Court for sentencing 
on the 25th day of July, 1995, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
4. It is further ordered that the Sheriff of Davis County, Utah , forthwith deliver 
the defendant to the Division of Corrections, Diagnostic Unit, Utah State Prison to be held at 
the Utah State Prison 
Dated at Farmington, Utah, May 23, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
k 
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ADDENDUM E 
76-3-403 CRIMINAL CODE 
crime charged in the information or found in State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct. App. 
the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1994). 
1991). 
Applicability of 1991 amendment. ^ _± * j • j • J r J *» . ^ , 
Where the trial court had granted defen- C o u r t er*ed m re,duc in* **»<UiiU two fel-
dant's motion under the 1990 version of this ™* convictions to class A misdemeanor convic-
section and entered a conviction for the next * o n s " l 8 t e a d ^ to class B misdemeanor convic-
lower category of the offense for which she had j!™8' ^ / * * * B a g 8 n a w ' 8 3 6 R 2 d 1 3 8 4 
been charged, she was not entitled to a second (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
reduction after she completed a period of pro-
 C i t e d i n S t a t e v D u 8 1 2 R 2 d 6Q ( U u h 
bation because, by that time, the 1991 amend-
 C t A 1 9 9 1 ) U n i t e d S t a t e f l g h 9 4 ? p 2 d 
ment of this section applied, preventing a sec- 1445 (ioth Cir 1991) 
ond reduction without prosecutorial consent. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=• 1208(2). 
76-3-403. Credit for good behavior against sentence for 
misdemeanor. 
In any commitment to imprisonment for a misdemeanor offense the custo-
dial authority may in its discretion and upon good behavior of the inmate allow 
up to ten days' credit against the sentence to be served for every 30 days served 
or up to two days' credit for every ten days served when the period to be served 
is less than 30 days. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, $ 76-3-402,1989, ch. 65, ft 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJJS. — 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1571. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 1216(1). 
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic 
evaluation — Commitment of defendant — Sen-
tencing procedure. 
(1) (a) (i) In felony cases where the court is of the opinion imprisonment 
may be appropriate but desires more detailed information as a basis 
for determining the sentence to be imposed than has been provided by 
the presentence report, the court may in its discretion commit a 
convicted defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections 
for a diagnostic evaluation for a period not exceeding 90 days. 
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a complete study 
and evaluation of the defendant during that time, inquiring into 
matters including: 
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or criminal experi-
ence; 
(B) his social background; 
(C) his capabilities; 
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical health; and 
84 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-404 
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs which may be 
available to suit his needs. 
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or by the expiration 
of additional commitment time the court may grant, not exceeding a 
further period of 90 days, the defendant shall be returned to the court 
for sentencing and the court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his 
attorney shall be provided with a written diagnostic evaluation report 
of results of the study, including any recommendations the Depart-
ment of Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be helpful 
to a proper resolution of the case. 
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court is supple-
mental to and becomes a part of the presentence investigation report, 
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report and recom-
mendations, the court shall proceed to sentence a defendant in 
accordance with the sentencing alternatives provided under Section 
76-3-201. 
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under this section does 
not constitute a commitment to prison. However, any person who is committed 
to prison following proceedings under this section shall be given credit against 
his sentence for the time spent in confinement for a presentence investigation 
report. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-404, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196,ft 76-3-404; 1985, ch. 212, ft 14; 
1989, ch. 245, ft 6; 1991, ch. 206, ft 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, assigned the 
designations (i) and (iiXA) through (UXE) in 
Subsection (lXa), assigned the designations (i) 
through (iii) in Subsection (1Kb), inserted ref-
erences to "diagnostic evaluation" and ''evalua-
tion* in Subsections (lXa) and UXb), deleted 
The Department of Corrections may contract 
with the Utah State Hospital to conduct all or a 
portion of that study from Subsection 
(lXaXiiXE), inserted Subsection (lXbXii), and 
made several stylistic changes throughout Sub-
section (1). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of trial court. 
Juvenile record. 
Rescinding recommendation for evaluation. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Whether trial judge elects to order an evalu-
ation before passing sentence is within his 
discretion; where judge stated, when defendant 
appeared before him for sentencing, that he 
would refer matter for a 90-day evaluation 
whereupon defendant attempted to escape from 
the courtroom, it was not an abuse of discretion 
forjudge to rescind his recommendation for the 
evaluation and proceed to sentence defendant; 
the original recommendation, made orally, was 
not part of the judgment and was not appeal-
able. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 
1978). 
Trial court had discretion to ignore correc-
tions division's request for a second 90-day 
diagnostic period in which to determine defen-
dant's suitability for long-term treatment in 
sexual offender program and to sentence defen-
dant to prison. State v. Carson, 597 P. 2d 862 
(Utah 1979). 
The decision to order an additional evalua-
tion lies within the discretion of the trial court, 
and unless there is a showing in the record of 
an abuse of discretion, the appellate court will 
affirm the sentence. State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1988). 
It is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to order an evaluation before passing 
sentence, and the appellate court will not dis-
turb a sentence unless the record clearly shows 
an abuse of that discretion, State v. Russell, 772 
P.2d 971 (1989); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1067 
(1989). 
The law does not compel a trial court to order 
a 90-day evaluation merely because it would 
have given the judge more information on 
which to base the sentence. State v. Gentle-
wind, 844 P.2d 372 (Utah Ct App. 1992). 
Juvenile record. 
Section 78-3a-44 prohibiting admission of ju-
venile court record into evidence in proceedings 
in any other court does not preclude inclusion of 
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v « 
77-18-1* Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extensiop — 
Hearings — Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
nth a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
irovided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
lea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3Xa) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
sdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
Nation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
[6) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
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sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the department regarding the pay-
ment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) 
by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation repeat ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are confidential and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or far use by the 
department 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support lie i» legally 
liable; 
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(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; . 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including 
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest 
in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate. 
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines, 
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any 
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection 
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own 
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised 
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation 
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines, 
restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
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(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facta 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to havq counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. * 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. • 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accor-
dance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mali-
cious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in (bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U.S.C A. Sec. 623,1986. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and cfui benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2Xg) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection. 
(16) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
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disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender, 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-6-406.6. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to liid department in accordance with Subsection (17). 
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: , 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
History: C. 1*63, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 112,1 17; 1986, ch. 829, ft h 1887, ch, 114, 
I960, eh. 16, | 8} 1881,eh. 68, | 2; 11*62, ch. ft 1; 1888, ch. 886, ft 1; 1880, eh. 184, ft 8; 
8, ft It 1888, eh. 47, ft 1| 1888, eh. 68, ft 1| 1891,ch.66, | 6; 1881,eh.206,ft 6; 1992.cn. 
1983, ch. 86, ft 8; 1884, eh. 20, ft l}1986,ch, 14. ft 8| 1888, ch. 62, ft 7| 1998, eh. 220, ft 8j 
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1884, eh. 18, ft 24; 1884, ch. 188, ft 1; 1884, 
ch. 280, ft 1; 191*5, ch, 20, ft 146; 1896, ch. 
117, ft 2; 1996, ch. 184, ft 1; 1896, ch. 801, ft 8; 
1996, ch. 337, ft 11; 1996, ch. 862, ft 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment by ch. 20, effective May 1, 1996, substi-
tuted "Subsections 76-3-201(4) and (6)' for 
"Subsections 76-3 201(3) and (4)* in Subsection 
(6X0 and replaced "Chapter 1" with Chapter V 
in Subsection (16). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1996, added references to "interest in 
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4)" in 
Subsections (6XO, <6Xi). (9Xa), (lOXaXii), and 
(13), deleted a reference to Subsection 76-3-
201(3) in Subsection (8Xi), corrected a reference 
in Subsection (16), and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 184, effective 
May 1, 1996, deleted a requirement of a "rec-
ommendation from the Department of Correc-
tions regarding the payment of restitution by 
the defendant" in Subsection (6XbXiik rewrote 
Subsection (6), making significant stylistic 
changes, decressing the time that the presen-
tence investigation must be available before 
trial, which had been ten days, and adding the 
possibility of a ten-day period to correct inaccu-
racies in ths report; and added "and disburse-
ment" after "collection'' in Subsection (9Xa). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 801, effective. 
May 1, 1896, substituted "the recommended 
amount of complete restitution" for "pecuniary 
damages," inserted "as defined In Subsection 
76-3-201(4)" twice and inserted "court-ordered"' 
in Subsection (6Xa) snd rewrote Subsection (9). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
May 1,1996, added "which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring" at the and of Subsec-
tion (8X0, added Subsections (16) and (17), and 
corrected a statutory reference in Subaection 
(16). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 362, effective 
May 1.1996, inserted "if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel* in the first sentence of 
Subsection (6% substituted "protected" for "pri-
vate" and "Chapter (2)" for "Chapter (1)" in the 
first sentence of Subsection (16), added Subsec-
tion (16Xe), and made related stylistic changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislativs Research and General 
Counsel. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1996, ch. 184, f 
6 directs that the smendmenta in that act to 
Subsection (6Xa) of this section snail supersede 
the amendments to the same subsection in I* 
1996, ch. 362. 
Laws 1996, ch. 801, f 6 provides that the 
amendments in that act to Subsections (6XbXii) 
and (9Xa) supersede the amendments to the 
same subsections by ch. 184, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSE 
Disclosure to defendant 
—Communications between Judge and proba-
tion officer. 
—Presentence report 
Disclosure to defendant 
—Communications between judge nasi 
probation officer. 
An ex parte communication between a proba-
tion officer snd s sentencing judge, in itself, 
does not violate constitutional protections; 
however, when s defendant establishes that the 
sentencing judge based his sentence upon inac-
curate or unreliable information received dur-
ing sn ex parte communication with a proba-
tion officer that was not disclosed to the 
defendant, resentencing may he necessary 
8tate v. Gomes, 867 P.2d 868 (Utah 1994X 
Since all of the Information upon which the 
sentencing judge relied was disclosed to defen-
dant in the presentence report and at the 
sentencing hearings, snd defendant was given 
an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of that 
information, the defendants right to effective 
counsel wss not violated. State v. Gomes, 887 
P.2d 663 (Utah 1894). 
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